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Abstract
We describe three market-inspired approaches to propositional satisfiability. The first is based
on a formulation of satisfiability as production on a supply chain, where producers of particular
variable assignments must acquire licenses to fail to satisfy particular clauses. Experiments show
that although this general supply-chain protocol can converge to market allocations corresponding to
satisfiable truth assignments, it is impractically slow. We find that a simplified market structure and a
variation on the pricing method can improve performance significantly. We compare the performance
of the three market-based protocols with distributed breakout algorithm and GSAT on benchmark
3-SAT problems. We identify a tradeoff between performance and economic realism in the market
protocols, and a tradeoff between performance and the degree of decentralization between the market
protocols and distributed breakout. We also conduct informal and experimental analyses to gain
insight into the operation of price-guided search.
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1. Introduction
Multiple agents must often engage in activities with complex, interrelated dependen-
cies. These dependencies may arise from contention for limited resources, scheduling con-
straints, or direct dependencies of activity on the results of other agents’ activities. Of-
ten, such problems of choosing activities, allocating resources, determining schedules, and
composing results from individual agents’ actions can be modeled as constraint satisfaction
problems (CSPs).
As members of the class of NP-complete problems, CSPs are widely considered to
be intractable. Even the best algorithms for NP-complete problems generally require
exponential time in the worst case. The problem of solving CSPs in the multiagent context
is further complicated by their decentralized nature, which imposes constraints on the
distribution of information and authority among participants. In a decentralized system,
the information state of an individual is considered private, and is disseminated only by
voluntary communication acts. This contrasts with centralized systems, in which it is
generally assumed that a single entity (the “center”) can obtain knowledge of the entire
information state, for example by compelling communication. Decentralization constraints
clearly restrict the computations performed by individual participants.
Yokoo and Hirayama [34,36] formalize CSPs with decentralization constraints as
distributed constraint satisfaction problems (DisCSPs) and, with others, have designed a
variety of effective algorithms, such as the distributed breakout (DB) algorithm [35]. These
approaches are generally distributed adaptations of centralized algorithms, and can perform
very effectively.
Markets provide another model of decentralized systems with clearly delineated
boundaries of knowledge and lines of communication. Typically, participants (agents)
maintain knowledge of only resources of direct interest, and interact with other agents
only indirectly through market institutions, such as auctions. The market-based approach
has become increasingly popular in recent years, as evidenced by the growing prevalence
in the AI literature of research in the design and analysis of computational market
systems and their underlying mechanisms. Markets have been proposed to solve a
diversity of problems, with climate control [33], power load management [32], allocating
computational servers [22], multicommodity flow [29], and belief aggregation [12] being
just a sample.
Shoham and Tennenholtz [19] directly pose the question “What can a market compute,
and at what expense?” They provide answers for some interesting cases, applying concepts
from economic mechanism design and communication complexity. Different behavioral
assumptions can support conclusions about additional cases. For instance, over fifty years
ago, Samuelson [13] considered how markets could decentralize the solution of linear
programming problems. More generally, adopting market protocols in the framework of
general equilibrium theory can be seen to yield a computational model capable of solving
convex programming problems [3]. However, none of these lines of analysis provide
answers with respect to the sort of combinatorial optimization problems of most interest in
AI and multiagent systems research.
To address this gap, we examine here the possibility of using markets to solve
propositional satisfiability (SAT) problems in a decentralized manner. We refer to a market
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protocol applied to the solution of SAT problems as a MarketSAT protocol. As the original
NP-complete problem, SAT is considered fundamental, has been thoroughly studied,
and indeed remains the object of active research. Studies in AI have led to a greater
understanding of its difficulty [4], and steady improvements in centralized algorithms,
starting with the success of GSAT [18].
We begin our exploration of market-inspired approaches to SAT by showing how to
transform SAT to a supply chain formation problem. We can then employ a previously-
developed market protocol for general supply chain formation problems [24,25,27], thus
obtaining a MarketSAT protocol. In Section 2 we describe the supply chain formation
problem and show how to reduce SAT to supply chain formation in the context of
an NP-completeness proof. In Section 3 we describe the Original MarketSAT protocol
(MS-O), based on the supply chain formation market protocol we previously developed.
We experimentally evaluate MS-O in Section 4 and find that, while MS-O can solve
SAT problems, it is prohibitively slow. In Section 5 we develop variant MarketSAT
protocols to address the performance shortcoming of MS-O. In Section 6 we discuss
the intuition behind the price-guided search of the MarketSAT protocols and show that
they are incomplete. In Section 7 we evaluate the protocols along different dimensions.
In Section 7.1 we describe experiments with the variant MarketSAT protocols. These
experiments show that the variants perform significantly better than Original MarketSAT,
but not as well as distributed breakout. We also investigate possible causes for the
performance discrepancies. We further evaluate the protocols in terms of degree of
decentralization (Section 7.2) and economic interpretation (Section 7.3), identifying
tradeoffs between these dimensions and performance. We conclude in Section 8.
2. Supply chain formation
2.1. The supply chain formation problem
Decentralized supply chain formation, informally, is the problem of assembling a
network of agents that can transform basic goods into composite goods of value, given
local knowledge and communication [25]. The term “good” refers to any discrete resource
or task for which the results cannot be shared between agents.
More precisely, we formulate the problem as follows [23,27]. A task dependency
network is a directed, acyclic graph, (V ,E), representing dependencies among agents and
goods. V = G ∪ A, where G is the set of goods and A = C ∪ Π is the set of agents,
comprised of consumers C and producers Π . Edges, E, connect agents with goods they
can use or provide. There exists an edge 〈g,a〉 from g ∈ G to a ∈ A when agent a can
make use of one unit of g, and an edge 〈a,g〉 when a can provide one unit of g. When an
agent can acquire or provide multiple units of a good, separately indexed edges represent
each unit. For instance, edges 〈a,g〉1 and 〈a,g〉2 would represent the fact that agent a can
provide two units of good g. The goods can be traded only in integer quantities.
A consumer wishes to acquire one unit of one good among a set of possible goods.
A producer can produce a single unit of an output good conditional on acquiring a certain
number each of some fixed set of input goods. A producer must acquire each of its inputs
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Fig. 1. A task dependency network.
Fig. 2. A solution for the task dependency network from Fig. 1. Shaded vertices and solid edges are in the solution.
to provide its output. Fig. 1 shows an example task dependency network. The boxes and
oblong shapes represent agents, the circles represent goods, and the arrows represent edges.
The agents on the right-hand side (agents c1 and c2) are consumers and the other agents
are producers. Observe that producer a1 requires no inputs to produce output good 1, while
producer a4 requires both of its input goods 1 and 2 to produce output good 4.
An allocation is a subgraph (V ′,E′)⊆ (V ,E). For g ∈G, an edge 〈a,g〉 ∈ E′ means
that agent a provides g, and 〈g,a〉 ∈ E′ means a acquires g. An agent is in an allocation
graph iff it acquires or provides a good. A good is in an allocation graph iff it is bought or
sold.
A producer is active iff it provides its output. A producer is feasible iff it is inactive
or acquires all its inputs. Consumers are always feasible. An allocation is feasible iff all
producers are feasible and all goods are in material balance, that is, the number of edges
into a good equals the number of edges out.
A solution is a feasible allocation such that one or more consumers acquire a desired
good. If c ∈C∩V ′ for solution (V ′,E′), then (V ′,E′) is a solution for c. Fig. 2 shows one
solution for the task dependency network from Fig. 1. The shaded agents and goods are in
the solution, and the solid arrows indicate exchanges of goods realized in the solution. The
dashed arrows indicate exchanges not realized in the solution. Observe that there is one
other solution for the network, containing agents c1, a1, a2, a3, and a5, as well as good 3,
but not agents a4 and c2, nor good 4.
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2.2. Supply chain formation is NP-complete
Due to constraints on resource availability, it is not possible to satisfy both consumers
in a solution simultaneously. Consumer c1 wants good 3, which can be provided by agent
a3 or a5. If we have a solution for c2, then a1 must provide good 1 to a4. But since a1
can produce only one unit of good 1 (recall that an edge indicates potential production
or acquisition of a single unit of a good) a3 cannot acquire good 1. Similarly, a5 cannot
acquire good 2, hence c1 cannot be in a solution concurrently with c2. As we shall see in
Section 2.2, resource constraints are a key feature that entail NP-completeness of supply
chain formation in task dependency networks. In Section 3 we describe a protocol for
satisfying these constraints in a highly decentralized fashion, giving us a decentralized
protocol for solving satisfiability problems.
The class of NP problems contains all problems that can be solved in polynomial time by
a nondeterministic computer. The NP-complete problem class contains all problems in NP
that are at least as hard (in terms of required computation) as every other problem in NP [7].
It is widely believed that NP-complete problems are intractable, requiring exponential time
to solve, in the worst case.
To develop the market approach to solving satisfiability problems, we show that the
problem of forming supply chains is NP-complete. To show this, we describe a reduction
transformation of SAT to the supply chain formation problem. The transformation
combined with a particular market protocol give us MS-O. First, we describe the standard
SAT problem and formulate supply chain formation as a decision problem.
Definition 1 (Satisfiability). (SAT)
Instance: Set U of variables, and collection Q of clauses, where each q ∈Q is a set of
literals over U .
Question: Is there a truth assignment t :U →{T ,F } that satisfies each q ∈Q?
Definition 2 (Supply chain formation decision problem). (SUPP-CHAIN)
Instance: A task dependency network, (V ,E), with agents, goods, and edges as described
above.
Question: Is there a solution (V ′,E′)⊆ (V ,E)?
Theorem 3. SUPP-CHAIN is NP-complete.
Proof concept. Standard methodology for proving NP-completeness [7] requires the
following:
(1) Show that SUPP-CHAIN is in the problem class NP. To do so, we need to demonstrate
that a proposed solution can be verified in polynomial time.
(2) Show that any instance of SAT can be reduced to an instance of SUPP-CHAIN in
polynomial time. The reduction transformation must be such that the answer to the
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SUPP-CHAIN decision problem instance is “yes” iff the answer to the SAT problem
instance is “yes”.
For use in the reduction transformation, we say that truth assignment t to variable u fails
to satisfy a clause q , denoted by FTS(q,u, t), iff either: (1) t = T , u /∈ q , and u¯ ∈ q , or, (2)
t = F , u¯ /∈ q , and u ∈ q . The key observation behind the reduction is that in a satisfying
truth assignment, at least one variable must satisfy any given clause, hence at most |q| − 1
variable assignments can fail to satisfy clause q . Thus the transformation ensures that, in
order to produce a truth assignment for a variable, a producer must acquire licenses to fail
to satisfy clauses. These licenses are the scarce resources (only |q| − 1 are available for
clause q) to be allocated.
The task dependency network corresponding to a SAT instance includes goods of the
following types:
• gq : license to fail to satisfy clause q ,
• gu: an assignment to variable u,
• gc: a satisfying overall assignment,
and agents of the following types:
• siq : for each i ∈ [1, |q| − 1], producer of a license to fail to satisfy q ,
• πu: producer of a positive assignment to u,
• πu¯: producer of a negative assignment to u,
• πc: producer of an overall assignment (from individual variable assignments),
• c: consumer of the overall assignment.
As described below, we construct the network in such a way as to ensure that only
satisfying assignments can be produced, primarily by controlling availability and necessity
of failure-to-satisfy licenses.
Proof. (SUPP-CHAIN is in NP). It is straightforward to verify that an allocation is a
solution by observing whether c obtains a good and by counting the edges incident on
each good and producer.
Reduction. We transform an instance of SAT to an instance of SUPP-CHAIN.
(1) For each q ∈Q, and each i ∈ [1, |q| − 1], add gq to G, add siq to Π , and add 〈siq , gq〉
to E.
(2) For each u ∈U , do the following:
• add gu to G,
• add πu to Π , add 〈πu,gu〉 to E, and for each q ∈Q such that u /∈ q and u¯ ∈ q , add
〈gq,πu〉 to E,
• add πu¯ to Π , add 〈πu¯, gu〉 to E, and for each q ∈Q such that u¯ /∈ q and u ∈ q , add
〈gq,πu¯〉 to E.
(3) Add c to C, gc to G, 〈gc, c〉 to E, πc to Π , and 〈πc, gc〉 to E. For each u ∈ U , add
〈gu,πc〉 to E.
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Fig. 3. The transformation for Q= {q1, q2}, q1 = {u1, u¯2, u¯4}, q2 = {u2, u¯3, u4}.
Fig. 3 shows the transformation for an example with Q = {q1, q2}, q1 = {u1, u¯2, u¯4},
q2 = {u2, u¯3, u4}.
A “yes” configuration for SUPP-CHAIN is a “yes” configuration for SAT. A solution
(V ′,E′) must be in material balance, which implies that, for each u ∈U , either 〈πu,gu〉 ∈
E′ or 〈πu¯, gu〉 ∈E′. If the former is true, then, we assign t (u)= T , otherwise t (u)= F .
Since there are |q| − 1 units of any gq available, each of which is in material balance,
there are at most |q| − 1 edges in E′ of the type 〈gq,πu〉 or 〈gq,πu¯〉. But then, there are at
most |q| − 1 variables in q ∈Q whose assignments fail to satisfy q , and hence at least one
variable whose assignment does satisfy q under t . Thus, t is a satisfying truth assignment.
Fig. 4 shows a feasible allocation that gives a satisfying truth assignment t (u1) = T ,
t (u2)= F , t (u3)= F , t (u4)= T , for the transformation network shown in Fig. 3. Observe
that, although πu¯4 is inactive, it acquires a unit of q2. For the purposes of the SAT
transformation, it is irrelevant whether inactive producers obtain their inputs, so long as
the entire allocation is feasible.
A “yes” configuration for SAT is a “yes” configuration for SUPP-CHAIN. If t is
a satisfying truth assignment in the instance of SAT, then we can map t to a solution
(V ′,E′) ⊆ (V ,E). First, add gc, πc, and each gu ∈G to V ′. Add 〈πc, gc〉 to E′, and for
each gu ∈G, add 〈gu,πc〉 to E′. As mentioned above, we can arbitrarily allocate excess
units of the licenses, so long as we maintain feasibility. Hence, Fig. 3 shows one way to
map truth assignment t (u1)= T , t (u2)= F , t (u3)= F , t (u4)= T , for the SAT instance
Q= {q1, q2}, q1 = {u1, u¯2, u¯4}, q2 = {u2, u¯3, u4}.
For u ∈U , if t (u)= T , then add πu to V ′ and add all input and output edges of πu to E′.
For each q ∈Q such that u /∈ q and u¯ ∈ q , add a new siq to V ′ and 〈siq , gq〉 to E′. If instead,
t (u)= F , then perform similar operations with u¯ and u reversed. Since t is satisfying, for
each q in Q there are at most |q| − 1 variables whose assignments fail to satisfy q , hence
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Fig. 4. A solution for the network from Fig. 3, which gives a satisfying truth assignment t (u1)= T , t (u2)= F ,
t (u3)= F , t (u4)= T . Shaded vertices and solid edges are in the solution.
at most |q| − 1 producers require gq as input in (V ′,E′). Hence, (V ′,E′) is feasible. It is
also a solution because 〈πc, gc〉 ∈E′.
The transformation runs in polynomial time. There are∑q∈Q(|q| − 1) clause suppliers
siq , each with one output. There are 2|U | literal producers πu, each with at most |Q| inputs
and one output. The producer πc has |U | inputs and one output. There are |Q| clause goods
gq and |U | variable goods gu. Thus the complexity of the transformation is O(|U ||Q|). ✷
3. Original MarketSAT protocol
Given full knowledge of a SAT problem, we could employ a centralized algorithm
known to be effective (e.g., GSAT [18]). But in a decentralized system, agents have
only localized knowledge about the problem or the intermediate states of any solution
procedure, and self-interested agents need incentives to participate. In the market
framework, price systems, by indicating the relative value of goods, help guide agents’
local decision making. We model agent self-interest in terms of recovering costs and
acquiring value. We assume that all producer costs are zero. The consumer c obtains value
vc(gc) for obtaining a single unit of good gc.
In previous work [23,25], we developed a market protocol—Simultaneous Ascending
(M+1)st-Price auction with Simple Bidding (SAMP-SB)—for the supply chain formation
problem. We found that the protocol can effectively form supply chains in task dependency
networks while requiring that an agent has knowledge only of valuations or costs, its goods
of interest, and the price information revealed by the auctions thereof. We can thus obtain
a market protocol for SAT—which we call Original MarketSAT (MS-O)—by applying
SAMP-SB to SAT task dependency networks.
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In the protocol, agents negotiate through auction mediators, one for each good. An
auction in turn determines the price and allocation of its respective good. For MS-O, and
the other MarketSAT protocols we subsequently describe, we assume reliable synchronous
message passing, whereby all agents update their bids simultaneously in synchronous
rounds and each auction updates and disseminates information to bidders only after
receiving all bids. This assumption serves only to focus study and simplify exposition,
for the protocols could be implemented in an asynchronous environment.
3.1. Auction mechanism
There is a separate auction for each good in the SAT task dependency network. Agents
interact with the auctions by submitting bids for goods they wish to buy or sell. A bid
specifies the price below/above which the agent is willing to buy/sell. When an auction
receives a new bid from each of its bidders, it sends each of its bidders a price quote
specifying the price that would result, and the number of units the good the bidder would
win, if the auction ended in the current bid state. Agents may then choose to revise their
bids in response to the notifications (unchanged bids remain standing at their current value
in the auction).
The auctions run simultaneously, and each auction requires that an agent’s successive
buy bids increase by no less than some (generally small) positive number δb and successive
sell bids increase by no less than δs .
PROCEDURE MS-O Auction Mechanism
Each agent submits initial bids to auctions according to its
bidding policy
UNTIL quiescence DO
CONCURRENTLY FOR EACH auction g DO
// Receive bids
Admit all buy bids that increase by δb
Admit all sell bids that increase by δs
Replace standing bids with new bids
MS-O Report Price Quote
END
CONCURRENTLY FOR EACH agent DO update bids
according to its bidding policy
END
// Clear auctions
CONCURRENTLY FOR EACH auction DO
g← good handled by the auction
FOR EACH bidder a DO
report the final values p(g) and ωa(g) to a,
as computed by the last price quote
END
Fig. 5. The MS-O auction mechanism.
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PROCEDURE MS-O Report Price Quote by the auction for good g
M ← number of sell bids
p(g)← (M + 1)st highest price of all bids
α(g)←M th highest price of all bids
FOR EACH buyer a that bids strictly above p(g) DO ωa(g)← 1
FOR EACH seller a that bids strictly below p(g) DO ωa(g)← 1
Match the maximum number of buyer and seller bids at p(g) one-to-one,
breaking ties in favor earlier bids, and set ωa(g)← 1
for each respective bidder a
Report p(g), α(g), and ωa(g) to each bidder a
Fig. 6. The report price quote procedure for the MS-O auction mechanism.
Bidding continues until quiescence, a state where all messages have been received, no
agent chooses to change the value of its bids, and no auction changes any aspect of its price
quote. At this point, the auctions clear; for each good g, each bidder a is notified of the
final price, denoted by p(g), and whether it is winning its bid (note that agents want at
most one unit of any given good in a MarketSAT task network), denoted by the indicator
ωa(g) ∈ {0,1}.
Each auction runs according to (M + 1)st-price rules [15,16,31]. The (M + 1)st price
auction is a variant of the (second-price) Vickrey auction [21], generalized to allow for the
exchange of multiple units of a good. Given a set of bids including M units offered for
sale, the (M+1)st-price auction sets a price, p(g) equal to the (M+1)st highest unit offer
over all of the bids. The price can be said to separate the winners from the losers, in that
the winners include all sell bids strictly below the price and all buy bids strictly above the
price. To maximize exchange at the trading price, some agents that bid at the (M + 1)st
price also win; in case of ties, bids submitted earlier have precedence. Winning buy and
sell bids are matched one-to-one.
When issuing price quotes, the auction reports both p(g) and the ask price, α(g) of
the good g. The ask price specifies the amount above which a buyer would have to bid in
order to buy the good, given the current set of bids. The ask price is determined by the
Mth highest of all bids in the auction, hence α(g) p(g). The auction also reports ωa(g)
to each agent a, which, before the auction clears, indicates the agent’s current, tentative
winning state based on current bid information.1
Figs. 5 and 6 detail the operation of the auction mechanism. As an example, consider a
state of the auction for good g with two sell offers at 7 and 4, and three buy offers at 8, 5,
and 3. Here, M = 2, so p(g)= 5 (the third highest offer) and α(g)= 7 (the second highest
offer). The sell offer at 4, which is lower than p(g), and the buy offer 8, which is higher
than p(g), will match. The buy offer for 5, which is equal to p(g), will not match because
the other sell offer, which at price 7 is strictly higher than p(g).
1 This added information is necessary to determine the current winning state when the agent’s bid is exactly
at p(g).
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PROCEDURE MS-O Consumer Update Bids by consumer wanting
good g
IF losing bid for g AND vc(g)−p(g)− δb  0 THEN bid p(g)+ δb for g
Fig. 7. The consumer bidding policy for the MS-O protocol.
PROCEDURE MS-O Producer Update Bids by producer π with
output gπ in MS-O
IF π is winning its bid for gπ THEN
FOR EACH input g of π DO
IF π is losing its bid for g THEN increase that bid by δb
END
END
FOR EACH input g of π DO
IF π is winning its bid for g, THEN pˆπ (g)← p(g)
ELSE pˆπ (g)← max(α(g), p(g)+ δb)
END
β(π,gπ )← previous bid by π for gπ
IF pˆπ (g) > β(π,gπ ) THEN bid max[β(π,gπ )+ δs , ∑〈g,π〉∈E pˆπ (g)] for gπ
Fig. 8. The producer bidding policy for the MS-O protocol.
3.2. Bidding policies
The strategic problem defined by the auction mechanism and the task dependency
network is of a complexity well beyond our ability to derive optimal solutions in the game-
theoretic sense. Therefore, we propose simple bidding policies based on myopic behavior
and local information. Although we believe that policies of this form are often plausible, we
acknowledge that in this context they are clearly not optimal from the agents’ perspectives.
Further strategic analysis is necessary to establish how agents would reasonably behave in
this environment.
Let the current going prices be p. Recall that a consumer desires only one good in a
SAT-reduced task dependency network.2 We assume that a consumer initially bids zero for
its good of interest. The consumer increases its bid minimally above the current good price
whenever it is not winning the bid and its next bid would not exceed its value. Fig. 7 details
the policy for updating bids.
We assume that producer π initially bids zero for its output gπ , and then changes the
bid in an attempt to recover the perceived costs pˆπ (g) of its inputs. If the consumer is
currently winning a good, it perceives the cost to be p(g). If it is losing, the producer
perceives the cost to be the maximum of α(g) and p(g) + δb, because it would have to
bid at least that much to ensure it wins the good, assuming all other agents’ bids remained
2 The consumer bidding policy we describe here is a specialization of a policy we described for general task
dependency networks [23], which includes consumer preferences over multiple goods.
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Fig. 9. A producer’s next bids, according to SAMP-SB, when δb = 1 and δs  2.
fixed. A producer initially bids zero for each of its input goods and gradually increases
these bids to ensure feasibility. Fig. 8 details the policy for updating bids.
Fig. 9 shows how a producer would bid next as a function of the current prices and
its current bids, when δb = 1 and δs  2. Relevant current price quotes are shown under
the goods, exogenously chosen for illustrative purposes. The dashed arrow from good B
indicates that the producer is currently losing B. The solid arrows indicate bids the producer
is winning.
3.3. Properties of original MarketSAT
SAMP-SB exhibits several salient properties that carry over from general task
dependency networks [23,24] to MS-O. The protocol ensures feasibility in quiescence,
by design. The ascending bids and bounded consumer value ensure that it converges
to quiescence. With synchronous bidding, MS-O reaches quiescence after a number of
bidding rounds polynomial in the network size and the magnitude of the consumer value.
The experimental results we present suggest that MS-O can require a large number of
rounds to reach a solution in quiescence (although it is not guaranteed to find a solution, as
we show in Section 6.2). Since the number of rounds is bounded by the consumer value,
this value effects a tradeoff between the runtime and the chance of finding a solution.
4. Experiments with original MarketSAT
To understand the performance of MS-O, we performed a battery of experiments
comparing MS-O to Distributed Breakout (DB) [35], an adaptation of the breakout
algorithm [11] to decentralized environments, and also to GSAT [18], a centralized
random-restart hill-climbing algorithm.
4.1. Construction
For these experiments we focus on the behavior of the protocols on hard, benchmark
SAT instances. These experiments were conducted using satisfiable (unforced, filtered)
Uniform Random 3-SAT problems at the phase transition (between 4.26 and 4.3
W.E. Walsh et al. / Artificial Intelligence 144 (2003) 125–156 137
clause/variable ratio for these instances) from the SATLIB benchmark library.3 It is
generally considered that the hardest problems occur at a phase transition (also called the
crossover point) in the clause/variable ratio where 50% of the problems are satisfiable [2,9,
10]. For this reason, problems at the phase transition have been widely used to benchmark
SAT algorithms. Satisfiable problems are used because many SAT algorithms (including all
the ones we study here) are incomplete and will run until the specified maximum iterations,
with indeterminate results, on unsatisfiable problems.4
Given that agents and auctions run in parallel, a plausible measure of runtime in a
MarketSAT protocol is bidding rounds. Within a given round, the clause auctions are the
bottleneck, running in O(|U | lg |U |) time (though incremental updating techniques can
improve amortized performance [31]). This measure is analogous to the cycles commonly
measured in experiments of DB [35]. For GSAT, we measured the number of flips, as is
customary for centralized algorithms.
To consider alternative measures, recall from the reduction transformation that for each
u ∈ U , there are producers πu and πu¯. The number of times they “swap” the license
to sell gu is directly analogous to flipping a variable. In any given round of MS-O,
zero or multiple such “flips” can take place. However, our experiments show that the
number of MS-O flips is approximately linear in the number of rounds (regression result:
flips= 0.5 rounds− 11.9, R2 = 0.99).
If the cost of computing a heuristic in a centralized algorithm is relatively expensive,
then the algorithm may actually run slower in practice than another that performs more
flips. In such cases, a finer-grained performance metric such as CPU cycles may be more
appropriate. In decentralized protocols however, communication delay can be a significant
factor in practical performance. For DB and the MarketSAT protocols we study, the
agent and auction computations are straightforward, hence we expect that communication
delay would dominate runtime in a distributed implementation of the protocols. With
the synchrony assumption, we consider the number of rounds to be the most appropriate
performance measure for our distributed protocols.
For MS-O, we set δb = δs = 1. To bound the computational time, for a problem instance
of n variables, we ran MS-O and DB for at most 1000n rounds. We ran GSAT with at
most 200 restarts and at most 5n flips per start. For MarketSAT, a round is a synchronous
bidding round, and for DB, a round corresponds to a cycle as described by Yokoo and
Hirayama [35]. Agents participate until they reach quiescence (with a satisfying solution),
or until the maximum number of rounds is reached. We recognize that the artificial limit
on the bidding rounds reduces the plausibility that agents may use the specified bidding
policy of MS-O and the subsequent MarketSAT protocols we consider (see Section 7.3).
Although it would be more natural to indirectly bound the run time with a bound on the
3 http://www.satlib.org/benchm.html.
4 To generate hard satisfiable problems, it is important to generate problems randomly and filter the
unsatisfiable instances, as we described. Forcing the problems to satisfy a particular assignment makes them much
easier [1]. The filtering method of problem generation can be infeasible for large problems because it requires the
use of a complete satisfiability testing algorithm, such as the Davis–Logemann–Loveland procedure [5], to filter
unsatisfiable instances. Achlioptas et al. [1] recently showed how to generate hard satisfiable problems efficiently
using quasigroups with holes.
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Table 1
Performance of protocols on Uniform Random 3-SAT problems at the
phase transition, with n variables. GSAT is measured by flips, and all other
protocols are measured by rounds
n Success ratio Mean Median σ
Protocol: MS-O
20 0.95 3.46 × 103 9.63 × 102 5.51× 103
50 0.40 3.90 × 104 5.00 × 104 18.1× 103
Protocol: GSAT
20 1.00 2.73 × 102 1.09 × 102 5.45× 102
50 1.00 1.26 × 103 5.78 × 102 1.83× 103
Protocol: DB
20 1.00 3.52 × 101 2.05 × 101 4.51× 101
50 1.00 2.34 × 102 6.45 × 101 8.29× 102
consumer value (Section 3.3), we chose the direct limit on rounds to consistently compare
the performance of the protocols.
4.2. Results
The performance is summarized in Table 1, showing the number of variables (n),
fraction of runs that successfully resulted in satisfying solutions (success ratio), and mean,
median, and standard deviation of flips (for GSAT) or rounds (for the other protocols).
The results from the 20-variable experiments show that MS-O can solve SAT problems,
albeit significantly slower than GSAT or DB. For the 50-variable problems, MS-O can
solve only 40% of the problems within the specified number of rounds, showing that MS-O
is prohibitively slow for even moderately small problems. Note that for the 50-variable
problems, a heavy tail on the upper end of the distribution of rounds was truncated because
MS-O was stopped at the maximum rounds in 60% of the runs. Hence, if we were to always
run MS-O until it found a solution, we would expect the mean and median measures to be
much higher.
5. Variant MarketSAT protocols
MS-O demonstrates that a market-inspired protocol can solve general combinatorial
problems in a highly decentralized fashion. However, MS-O’s unimpressive performance
seems to bode poorly for the prospect that market models could provide a practical ap-
proach for decentralizing combinatorial problems. It is important that we not immediately
discount the market approach with this evidence, as we might conceive of a myriad of other
market, or market-inspired, approaches that may prove to be more effective.
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Fig. 10. A simplified transformation for the same SAT instance represented in Fig. 3, Q = {q1, q2},
q1 = {u1, u¯2, u¯4}, q2 = {u2, u¯3, u4}.
To guide our exploration of alternate market protocols, we should identify aspects of
MS-O that may contribute to its poor performance. A number of features of the task
dependency network encoding of SAT problems may reduce performance. Because the
assignments are represented as separate agents, the two assignment agents for a particular
variable can coordinate only indirectly, through the auction for their shared variable, to
determine which assignment is (tentatively) chosen. A more direct encoding might have
a single agent represent a variable. Such a variable agent could directly determine the
currently best assignment based on the price of licenses for both assignments, without the
need to wait a bidding round for its variable auction to report a new price quote.5 The
presence of the overall assignment producer, πc, and the end consumer, c, can also slow
down MS-O, because bids and prices must generally pass through these agents before
updates can be propagated to the license auctions. To see this, consider a state in which,
for a particular variable u, neither assignment producer is winning the right to make an
assignment to the variable, and price of gc is higher than the current offer price of c.
Neither assignment producer will update its bids for any license until first, c adjusts its
offer price higher than the current bid of πc for gc, and then πc increases its offer price for
u above the offer price of one of the producers for assignments to u. This process could
potentially take many rounds.
With these observations, we could formulate an alternate, simplified market represen-
tation of a SAT problem. As suggested above, we dispense with the overall assignment
producer πc and consumer c, as well as the variable goods gu. As with the original Mar-
ketSAT, we make available |q| − 1 licenses to fail to satisfy clause q . We also assume that
the license producers siq exist as before. For each variable u we have a variable agent au
that determines the assignment u. In order to select an assignment, agent au must obtain a
5 This alternate encoding centralizes the information and control for a particular variable, as compared to
the original task dependency network encoding. One might argue, though, that it is more natural to have agents
represent variables, rather than assignments.
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license gq for all clauses q its chosen assignment fails to satisfy. A selection of assignments
by variable agents corresponds to a satisfying SAT assignment iff every agent acquires all
the licenses necessary for its assignment. Fig. 10 shows a simplified transformation of the
same SAT instance shown transformed in Fig. 3.
In addition to the simplified network structure, we also explore alternate auction
mechanisms for the license goods, along with different bidding policies.
In the following sections we describe two variants on MS-O using the simplified SAT
market structure described in this section. As with MS-O, agents submit bids to the auctions
for licenses and the auctions respond with price quotes. Bidding occurs synchronously in
rounds, and the protocols continue until quiescence. The license producers continue to
place one-time sell offers with price zero, hence we focus on the bidding of the variable
agents. As we see from the experimental results in Section 7.1, these variant protocols find
solutions much more quickly than MS-O.
5.1. Uniform pricing
The MarketSAT protocol with uniform pricing (MS-U) is based on MS-O, but adapted
to the simplified structure. An auction allows an agent to place a bid containing an offer
to buy one license at a specified price. A variable agent may update its bid only if it
increases the price of the offer by at least some publicly known increment δb. Agents
may not withdraw bids.
The auctions are identical to those in MS-O. Since, as in MS-O, the license producers
siq do not change their bids, the (M + 1)st auction rules compute prices and (tentative)
PROCEDURE MS-U Report Price Quote by the auction for good gq ,
a license to fail to satisfy clause q
IF there are more than |q| − 1 buy offers THEN
p(gq)← |q|th highest price of all bids
α(gq)← (|q| − 1)st highest price of all bids
END
ELSE IF there are exactly |q| − 1 buy offers THEN
p(gq)← 0






Select the |q| − 1 highest buy bids, breaking ties in favor of earlier bids,
and set ωa(g)← 1 for each respective buyer a
S = a set of randomly chosen sell bidders such that
|S| ← |{ωa(g)= 1 | a is a buyer}|
FOR EACH a ∈ S DO ωa(g)← 1
Report p(g), α(g), and ωa(g) to each bidder a
Fig. 11. The report price quote procedure for the MS-U auction mechanism.
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PROCEDURE MS-U Variable Agent Update Bids by agent au
representing variable u
rT ← previously computed assignment cost for t (u)= T
rF ← previously computed assignment cost for t (u)= F
FOR EACH input good g of a DO
IF ωa(g)= 1 THEN pˆau(gq)← p(g)
ELSE pˆau(g)← max(α(g), α(g)+ δb)
END
GT ←{gq ∈G | FTS(q,u,T )}
GF ←{gq ∈G | FTS(q,u,F)}
t (u)← arg maxγ∈{T ,F }(
∑
g∈Gγ pˆau(g), rγ ), breaking ties in favor of
previous assignment
FOR EACH g ∈Gt(u) DO
IF ωau(g)= 0 THEN increment bid for g by δb
END
FOR EACH g ∈G
t(u)
DO bid zero for g
Fig. 12. The variable agent bidding policy for the MS-U protocol.
allocations based on the current offers from variable agents and the number of licenses
available, M = |q| − 1. To be more concrete in the MarketSAT context, Fig. 11 details the
auction rules specifically for MS-U.
In MS-U, each producer places an initial bid of zero for its clause and does not update its
bids. A variable agent randomly chooses the initial assignment for its variable and places
offers at price zero for the necessary licenses. When it subsequently receives price quotes,
it increments its losing bids for the assignment that maximizes its perceived cost, under
the assumption that the cost of an assignment does not decrease in subsequent rounds. The
variable agent submits offers at prize zero for goods needed for the alternative assignment.
Fig. 12 details the variable agent update bids policy in MS-U. Observe that if the market
reaches quiescence in this way, then the agents’ local assignments constitute a globally
satisfying assignment.
5.2. Differential pricing
In the MarketSAT protocol with differential pricing (MS-D), an auction allows an agent
to place a bid to demand either zero or one units of the license, without specifying a price.
Agents may switch between zero and one quantity demands without constraint.
An auction for good g may report a different price quote pa(g) to each bidder a,
depending on the demand for the license. An auction maintains a nondecreasing premium
price, ρ(g) for its license. When demand is less than the supply of licenses, the auction
reports a price of zero to all bidders. When demand equals supply, the auction reports
the premium to the one agent that did not demand the good to discourage it from creating
excess demand. When there is excess demand, the auction increases the premium price and
reports it to one of the agents to encourage that agent to reduce its own demand. Fig. 13
details the auction rules for the MS-D protocol.
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PROCEDURE MS-D Report Price Quote by the auction for good gq ,
a license to fail to satisfy clause q
d = the total demand expressed by bids in the auction
IF d < |q| − 1 THEN
Report pa(gq)← 0 to each bidder a
Report ωw(gq)← 1 to each bidder w that bid for one unit
Report ωl(gq)← 0 to each bidder l that bid for zero units
END
ELSE IF d = |q| − 1 THEN
Report pw(gq)← 0 and ωw(gq)← 1 to each bidder w
that bid for one unit
Report pl(gq)← ρ(gq) and ωw(gq)← 0 to the bidder l
that bid for zero units
END
ELSE IF d > |q| − 1 THEN
ρ(gq)← ρ(gq)+ 1
Report pl(gq)← ρ(gq) and ωw(gq)← 0 to one randomly
chosen bidder l
Report pw(gq)← 0 and ωw(gq)← 1 to each w of the other bidders
END
Fig. 13. The report price quote procedure for the MS-D auction mechanism.
PROCEDURE MS-D Variable Agent Update Bids by agent au,
representing variable u in MS-D
GT ←{gq ∈G | FTS(q,u,T )}
GF ←{gq ∈G | FTS(q,u,F)}
t (u)← arg maxγ∈{T ,F }
∑
g∈Gγ pau(g), breaking ties in favor of
previous assignment
FOR EACH g ∈Gt(u) DO bid for one unit of g
FOR EACH g ∈G
t(u)
DO bid for zero units of g
END
Fig. 14. The variable agent bidding policy for the MS-D protocol.
An agent randomly chooses the initial assignment for its variable. When it subsequently
receives price quotes, it chooses an assignment that minimizes the sum of the prices of
licenses as reported by the last price quote, with preference for its current assignment
when the costs are equal. An agent bids to demand quantity one for the licenses for its
currently chosen assignment, and quantity zero for its unneeded licenses. Fig. 14 details the
variable agent update bids policy for MS-D. Observe that if the market reaches quiescence
in this way, then the agents’ local assignments constitute a globally satisfying assignment.
Furthermore, in this case every agent pays zero for the licenses it receives.
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6. Price-guided search
6.1. Intuition for price-guided search in MarketSAT protocols
Intuitively, market prices indicate the relative global value of licenses, and agents use the
prices to guide their local decisions. The bidding process can be seen as a distributed search
for prices that support a satisfying allocation. In particular, the prices of certain licenses
must rise sufficiently high relative to other licenses to block out variable assignments that
cannot be a part of the solution.
In the MarketSAT protocols, prices are closely analogous to the weights of nogoods
(which correspond exactly to failing to satisfy a clause) in the breakout algorithm [11],
presented in Fig. 15. In breakout, weights are a measure of how often the nogoods appear
in local minima visited by the algorithm. The weights bias the search away from expensive
nogoods, hence away from local minima.
In contrast to breakout, which increases the costs of nogoods only when the global state
is a local minimum, the MarketSAT protocols increase the prices of licenses in response
to local state. The price of a license increases whenever the corresponding clause is not
satisfied for the current assignment, which can and does occur outside of local minima
of the global state. This aspect of MarketSAT may actually be beneficial, for Frank [6]
reported that increasing weights of nogoods not only at local minima, but also when the
nogood is not satisfied, can improve the performance of GSAT.
The breakout algorithm sequentially flips variable assignments to reduce the global
weight of the violated nogoods. The nogood weights are counted only for clauses that
are not satisfied. In MS-O and MS-U, because bids cannot be withdrawn, once a license
has an excess demand, it will always have excess demand, even if the current choices of
variable assignments would indicate that the clause is currently satisfied. Thus the prices
never decrease and agents attribute a cost to a license even if the clause is satisfied. In
contrast, agents can reduce their bid demands to zero in MS-D. As as result, an agent
will only attribute a positive cost to a license if either the license is over-demanded or if
flipping its own assignment would make the license over-demanded (assuming no other
agent would also flip). In this sense, the cost evaluation in MS-D is closer to the breakout
algorithm than in MS-O and MS-U.
Breakout Algorithm
Initialize the weight of all nogoods to 1
UNTIL current state is solution DO
IF current state is not a local minimum
THEN make any local change that reduces
the total weights of violated nogoods
ELSE increase weights of all currently
violated nogoods
END
Fig. 15. The breakout algorithm [11].
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In breakout, current nogood costs are evaluated uniformly for all variables. In MS-O
and MS-U, an agent distinguishes its cost evaluation for licenses depending on whether it
is winning (in which case it uses the bid price) or losing (in which case it uses the ask price
or the ask price plus δb), and assumes that its total cost over all licenses never decreases.
This difference in perceived prices gives extra “friction” to the currently winning agents
because they assume lower costs, hence are somewhat less likely to swap assignments
(recall that in MS-U, assignment swapping is done directly by variable agents, while in
MS-O, it is determined by the variable auctions). However, this friction is relatively small
because agents increase their offers by δb only when they are losing, hence the bid and ask
prices never differ by more than δb. In MS-D, agents can attribute widely varying costs to
a license, with at most one agent attributing the premium cost and others attributing a zero
cost.
Unlike breakout, variables can flip simultaneously in the MarketSAT protocols. This
could be beneficial to performance when agents operate in parallel, if the right flips
occur simultaneously. Yokoo and Hirayama [35] observed that it could be detrimental if
neighbor variables—those that share a clause—flip simultaneously, and thus incorporated
synchronizing steps into DB to prevent simultaneous neighbor flips.
Of particular concern are simultaneous, satisfying neighbor flips—neighbors simul-
taneously flipping to satisfy a clause (e.g., variables x and y simultaneously flipping to
T to satisfy clause (x ∨ y)), which we should expect to be prevalent in the MarketSAT
protocols. When neighbor variables simultaneously flip to satisfy the same clause, other
clauses may become needlessly unsatisfied. Unlike DB, the MarketSAT protocols have no
explicit mechanism to prevent simultaneous neighbor flips, yet we should expect the dif-
ferent protocols to differ in the number of simultaneous, satisfying neighbor flips. In MS-O
and MS-U, because the bid/ask spread on any license is small, agents that desire common
licenses are likely to have similar total cost evaluations for licenses. Hence, when the price
of a shared license increases, they may be likely to simultaneously flip to satisfy the clause.
In MS-D, because agents can attribute widely varying costs to licenses, the cost evaluations
of neighbor agents are less likely to be close than in MS-O and MS-U. We should expect
this would reduce the number of simultaneous, satisfying neighbor flips.
6.2. Incompleteness of MarketSAT protocols
We can show that MS-U is incomplete using a close variant of the example that
Morris [11] used to show that the (centralized) breakout algorithm is incomplete. We
assume synchrony, noting that this implies the same for an asynchronous system. The CNF
clauses are: (x¯ ∨ y), (x¯ ∨ z), (x¯ ∨w), (y¯ ∨ x), (y¯ ∨ z), (y¯ ∨w), (z¯∨ x), (z¯∨ y), (z¯∨w),
(w¯ ∨ x), (w¯ ∨ y), (w¯ ∨ z). Observe that the only solution for the problem assigns all
variables T or all variables F . Consider the case when the initial random assignments are
t (x)= t (z)= T and t (y)= t (w)= F . Each agent submits offers at price zero for all the
clauses it fails to satisfy in its current assignment. Assume that the random tie breaking
occurs as follows in the first round: x wins (x¯ ∨ y), y wins (z¯ ∨ y), z wins (z¯ ∨ w), and
w wins (x¯ ∨w). Tie breaking is not necessary in the other auctions because they all have
zero or one offer.
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After the initial round, all variable agents have a cost of one for their current assignments
and zero for their other assignments. Hence, all agents flip assignments in the second round
and submit offers at price zero for the clauses they fail to satisfy with the new assignments.
Assume that the random tie breaking occurs as follows in the second round: y wins (y¯∨x),
x wins (w¯ ∨ x), z wins (y¯ ∨ z), and w wins (z∨ w¯).
After round two, all agents have a cost of two for their current assignment and a cost of
one for their other assignment, hence choose to flip assignments. In all subsequent rounds,
agents have the same cost difference between their current and alternate assignments,
auction tie breaking is deterministic (i.e., in favor of earlier bids), and agents continue
to flip assignments simultaneously in the same rounds. Hence, the agents never converge
to all equal assignments, and the protocol oscillates indefinitely.
The particular behavior in this example relies on the earliest-bid tie-breaking rule.
Although we have not systematically explored alternate tie-breaking rules, we know that
they would engender different behavior in the protocol. For instance, with random tie
breaking, MS-U would not necessarily fall into the exact oscillations we describe above.
However, because random tie breaking could break ties just like earliest-bid tie breaking
with positive probability, MS-U remains incomplete with random tie breaking.
With the same SAT instance we used to show incompleteness of MS-U (but with
different initial assignments and tie breakings), in our simulations we observed oscillations
in flipping of variables, strongly suggesting to us that MS-O is not guaranteed to converge
to a solution. We refrain from describing a trace of a non-converging run due to the greater
complexity of the agent interactions in MS-O.
We can also show that MS-D is incomplete using Moris’s exact example. The CNF
clauses are: (x ∨ y ∨ z ∨w), (x¯ ∨ y), (x¯ ∨ z), (x¯ ∨w), (y¯ ∨ x), (y¯ ∨ z), (y¯ ∨w), (z¯∨ x),
(z¯ ∨ y), (z¯ ∨ w), (w¯ ∨ x), (w¯ ∨ y), (w¯ ∨ z). Observe that the only solution assigns all
variables T . Consider the initial random assignment t , such that t (x) = T and all other
variables are F . The premium increases in each of the unsatisfied clauses so long as they
remain unsatisfied, but the choice of which variable in the clauses pays the premium is
chosen randomly. With positive probability, x can always be the only variable chosen to
pay the premium, in which case it will flip indefinitely and no other variables will flip.
If the breakout algorithm reaches truth assignment t as described in the preceding, it
cannot converge to the satisfying truth assignment [11]. But because MS-D has variable-
specific pricing, it does not necessarily make a flip when it would be a global improvement,
which can delay undesirable flips. In fact, MS-D can always converge, with positive
probability, to some satisfying truth assignment t∗, from any state. Consider an alternate,
non-satisfying truth assignment ti at round i of the protocol and a set of variables Ui such
that ti (u) = t∗(u) for each u ∈ Ui . The prices will increase only for licenses corresponding
to unsatisfied clauses. For these licenses, the auction will decide randomly which variable
receives a premium price quote. With positive probability the auctions will choose variables
from only Ui . Whenever this happens, each u ∈ Ui will have a higher cost for assignment
ti(u), hence will flip to t∗(u) and Ui is strictly reduced. Since we can apply this reasoning
to successive rounds, it follows that, with positive probability, MS-D will reach a round j
in which Uj = ∅, which must be a satisfying truth assignment. Hence, MS-D can converge
to a satisfying truth assignment (when one exists) from any other truth assignment, with
positive probability. We have shown that this does not hold for the other MarketSAT
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protocols, although we do not know if small modifications, such as to tie-breaking rules,
would give us this property.
7. Evaluation of MarketSAT variants
SAT algorithms are typically evaluated on their runtime performance, hence we
experimentally compare our MarketSAT protocols with each other and with DB and GSAT
in Section 7.1. While important, speed is not the only attribute of interest in our study
of the protocols. In Section 7.2 we discuss the decentralization characteristics of the
MarketSAT protocols and DB, and in Section 7.3 we consider the degree to which our
market-inspired protocols lend themselves to a more rigorous economic interpretation. We
identify a tradeoff between performance and economic realism in the market protocols,
and a tradeoff between performance and the degree of decentralization between the market
protocols and DB.
7.1. Performance comparison of MarketSAT variants
In this section we describe the results of experiments comparing all of the MarketSAT
protocols to DB and GSAT. We construct the experiments as described in Section 4.1.
In addition to the “Uniform Random 3-SAT” problems at the phase transition, we ran
experiments on other classes of SAT problems from the SATLIB benchmark library. Recall
that the Uniform Random 3-SAT problems at the phase transition are generally considered
the hardest for SAT solvers. To evaluate performance on more structured problems, we
ran experiments on SAT-encoded “Flat Graph Coloring” problems that are very hard to
solve on average for graph coloring algorithms like the Brelaz heuristic [8]. We also
ran experiments on “Controlled Backbone Size” problems, for which the difficulty is
parameterized by the number of clauses and the backbone size. The backbone size is the
number of entailed literals. (A literal is entailed by a satisfiable SAT instance iff that literal
must be true for the SAT instance to be satisfied.) Singer et al. [20] showed that for the local
search algorithm WSAT/SKC, runtime increases with a smaller number of clauses and a
larger backbone. To determine whether the MarketSAT protocols behave similarly, we ran
one set of experiments with a fixed number of variables and varying backbone sizes, and
another set with a fixed backbone size and varying numbers of clauses. We ran experiments
on only the first 100 instances of each Controlled Backbone Size problem set.
The performance of all the protocols is summarized in Tables 2–6, again showing
fraction of runs that successfully resulted in satisfying solutions (success ratio), and mean,
median, and standard deviation of flips (for GSAT) or rounds (for all other protocols), as
well as problem size measures appropriate for the particular benchmark. In each table,
the problems increase in difficulty from top to bottom. Comparing the protocols from top
to bottom, each subsequent protocol improves by about a factor of two to ten on mean
and median performance measures. A notable exception is performance on the larger Flat
Graph Coloring problems, for which DB performs much better than MS-D in success
and median measures. Our experiments with the Controlled Backbone Size problems
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Table 2
Performance of protocols on Uniform Random 3-SAT problems at the phase
transition with n variables. GSAT is measured by flips, with all other protocols
measured by rounds
n Success ratio Mean Median σ
Protocol: MS-O
20 0.95 3.46× 103 9.63 × 102 5.51 × 103
50 0.40 3.90× 104 5.00 × 104 18.1 × 103
Protocol: MS-U
20 1.00 2.66× 102 1.07 × 102 4.86 × 102
50 0.96 6.12× 103 1.51 × 103 1.15 × 104
75 0.75 2.75× 104 1.08 × 104 3.03 × 104
100 0.53 6.10× 104 8.21 × 104 4.16 × 104
Protocol: GSAT
20 1.00 1.32× 102 4.00 × 101 2.31 × 102
50 1.00 1.26× 103 5.78 × 102 1.83 × 103
75 1.00 4.36× 103 2.15 × 103 5.33 × 103
100 0.99 1.30× 104 5.38 × 103 1.94 × 104
125 0.94 2.46× 104 1.10 × 104 3.23 × 104
Protocol: MS-D
20 1.00 7.20× 101 4.05 × 101 9.17 × 101
50 1.00 8.96× 102 2.50 × 102 3.52 × 103
75 0.98 3.98× 103 4.29 × 102 1.17 × 104
100 0.96 1.04× 104 1.50 × 103 2.34 × 104
125 0.85 2.74× 104 3.65 × 103 4.45 × 104
150 0.85 3.69× 104 5.94 × 103 5.45 × 104
175 0.83 5.37× 104 1.63 × 104 6.68 × 104
Protocol: DB
20 1.00 3.52× 101 2.05 × 101 4.51 × 101
50 1.00 2.34× 102 6.45 × 101 8.29 × 102
75 0.99 2.14× 103 2.99 × 102 9.40 × 103
100 0.98 4.26× 103 4.60 × 102 1.61 × 103
125 0.96 9.12× 103 1.42 × 103 2.63 × 104
150 0.93 1.80× 104 1.22 × 103 4.24 × 104
175 0.88 2.98× 104 2.83 × 103 5.81 × 104
demonstrate results (Tables 4–6) qualitatively consistent with Singer et al., with runtime
increasing with more clauses and smaller backbone.
It appears that the improvement of MS-U over MS-O is due to the simplified network
structure, since MS-U is otherwise essentially the same as MS-O. One plausible conjecture
for the difference between MS-U, MS-D, and DB is differing numbers of simultaneous,
satisfying neighbor flips. A corresponding prediction would be that an ordering of the
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Table 3
Performance of the protocols on SAT-encoded Flat Graph Coloring problems with n variables and the specified
number of vertices and edges GSAT is measured by flips, and all other protocols are measured by rounds
Vertices Edges n Success ratio Mean Median σ
Protocol: MS-U
30 60 90 1.00 1.73 × 103 1.03 × 103 2.66 × 103
50 115 150 0.92 3.80 × 104 1.70 × 104 4.54 × 104
Protocol: GSAT
30 60 90 1.00 1.19 × 103 5.83 × 102 1.92 × 103
50 115 150 1.00 1.33 × 104 9.09 × 103 1.54 × 104
Protocol: MS-D
30 60 90 1.00 4.40 × 102 2.81 × 102 5.23 × 102
50 115 150 0.99 3.91 × 103 8.75 × 102 1.62 × 104
75 180 225 0.97 1.65 × 104 2.88 × 103 4.16 × 104
100 239 300 0.89 6.02 × 104 1.14 × 104 9.71 × 104
125 301 375 0.77 6.63 × 104 2.82 × 104 1.56 × 105
Protocol: DB
30 60 90 1.00 1.17 × 102 7.65 × 101 1.46 × 102
50 115 150 1.00 9.47 × 102 2.09 × 102 3.99 × 103
75 180 225 1.00 3.82 × 103 5.72 × 102 1.51 × 104
100 239 300 0.98 1.36 × 104 8.95 × 102 5.02 × 104
125 301 375 0.95 3.51 × 104 5.16 × 102 9.23 × 104
protocols by increasing simultaneous, satisfying neighbor flips would accord with their
performance rank.
To test this conjecture we measured the simultaneous, satisfying neighbor flips in
both MS-D and MS-U on Uniform Random 3-SAT problems. Also, recognizing that the
MarketSAT protocols are much like breakout, but with simultaneous flips, we modified the
centralized breakout algorithm to allow simultaneous flips (with some ad hoc parameters
to control the number of simultaneous flips and simultaneous, satisfying neighbor flips).
To gain insight about the effects of simultaneous, satisfying neighbor flips, we tested
breakout with simultaneous flips (SFB) with varying fractions of such neighbor flips. We
also varied the number of generic simultaneous flips to help distinguish their contribution
to performance from neighbor flips.
Table 7 shows the mean number of flips, flips per flip round (flips per round in which
a flip actually occurred), and fraction of simultaneous, satisfying neighbor flips for MS-U,
MS-D, DB, and SFB. As expected, MS-U performs substantially more simultaneous,
satisfying neighbor flips absolutely, and as a fraction of the total flips, than does MS-D.
However, the results from SFB do not support the conjecture that the neighbor flips
contribute significantly to the performance difference. The performance of SFB does not
appear to be sensitive to, or even monotonic in, the fraction of simultaneous, satisfying
neighbor flips.
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Table 4
Performance of protocols on Controlled Backbone Size problems with 100 variables, 449 clauses, and
varying backbone sizes. GSAT is measured by flips, and all other protocols are measured by rounds
Clauses Backbone Success ratio Mean Median σ
Protocol: MS-O
449 10 0.27 9.03 × 104 1× 105 2.24 × 104
Protocol: MS-U
449 10 0.99 9.19 × 103 2.98 × 103 1.60 × 104
449 30 0.81 3.79 × 104 1.77 × 104 3.85 × 104
449 50 0.73 4.53 × 104 2.39 × 104 4.09 × 104
449 70 0.67 5.24 × 104 4.99 × 104 3.94 × 104
Protocol: GSAT
449 10 1.00 1.70 × 103 1.14 × 103 1.19 × 103
449 30 1.00 4.27 × 103 2.32 × 103 5.19 × 103
449 50 1.00 5.87 × 103 3.09 × 103 7.35 × 103
449 70 1.00 7.72 × 103 4.74 × 103 8.60 × 103
Protocol: MS-D
449 10 1.00 7.36 × 102 4.94 × 102 8.26 × 102
449 30 1.00 3.10 × 103 7.92 × 102 1.03 × 104
449 50 1.00 3.60 × 103 9.68 × 102 8.26 × 103
449 70 0.97 5.81 × 103 1.28 × 103 1.72 × 104
449 90 0.91 1.88 × 104 5.05 × 103 3.06 × 104
Protocol: DB
449 10 1.00 2.38 × 102 1.07 × 102 4.41 × 102
449 30 1.00 6.68 × 102 2.20 × 102 1.44 × 103
449 50 1.00 6.29 × 102 2.97 × 102 1.20 × 103
449 70 1.00 6.05 × 102 3.13 × 102 9.06 × 102
449 90 0.98 5.34 × 103 9.93 × 102 1.64 × 104
Table 7 suggests an alternate explanation of the performance difference between DB
and MS-D. For 50-variable problems, MS-D requires nearly 3.8 times as many rounds as
DB, but only 2.2 times as many flips. We also measured the number of rounds in which
MS-D and DB performed flips and found that, in fact, the average number of rounds in
which variables actually flip in MS-D is 316, only 35% of the average total rounds. The
average number of rounds in which DB performed a flip is 73% of its average total rounds.
Thus it seems that the poor performance of MS-D relative to DB is due to the extra rounds
required to produce flips.
We conjecture that these extra rounds in MS-D happen because auctions randomly
reassign the premium price at each round. Thus the agents’ costs fluctuate randomly, and
do not directly progress every time the premium increases. To verify this conjecture, we
tested a variation of MS-D whereby pricing is reported as the premium and a fraction b of
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Table 5
Performance of MS-O, MS-U, and GSAT on Controlled Backbone Size problems with 100
variables, backbone size 30, and varying numbers of clauses. GSAT is measured by flips, and
all other protocols are measured by rounds
Clauses Backbone Success ratio Mean Median σ
Protocol: MS-O
449 30 0.13 9.66 × 104 1 × 105 1.66 × 104
Protocol: MS-U
449 30 0.81 3.79 × 104 1.77 × 104 8.65 × 104
411 30 0.85 3.16 × 104 1.28 × 104 3.60 × 104
435 30 0.81 3.85 × 104 2.46 × 104 3.79 × 104
429 30 0.65 4.91 × 104 2.88 × 104 4.28 × 104
423 30 0.66 5.23 × 104 4.60 × 104 4.12 × 104
418 30 0.58 5.58 × 104 5.16 × 104 4.30 × 104
411 30 0.65 5.14 × 104 3.99 × 104 4.19 × 104
403 30 0.51 6.03 × 104 8.23 × 104 4.20 × 104
Protocol: GSAT
449 30 1.00 4.27 × 103 2.33 × 103 5.19 × 103
441 30 1.00 4.56 × 103 2.64 × 103 5.93 × 103
435 30 1.00 5.41 × 103 2.79 × 103 7.80 × 103
429 30 1.00 5.10 × 103 2.71 × 103 6.15 × 103
423 30 1.00 6.05 × 103 2.81 × 103 1.14 × 104
418 30 1.00 7.31 × 103 4.31 × 103 9.38 × 103
411 30 1.00 7.24 × 103 4.72 × 103 8.75 × 103
403 30 1.00 8.80 × 103 5.56 × 103 1.12 × 104
the premium (rather than the premium or zero as in MS-D). With a positive b, an agent’s
costs would not fluctuate so heavily from random assignments of the premium cost. We
tried b= 0.1 on 50-variable problems and found that it required only 509 rounds, 462 flips,
and 231 flip rounds. The ratio of rounds to flip rounds is only 2.2 with b = 0.1, compared
to 2.8 for MS-D. Furthermore, although the variant with b = 0.1 outperformed MS-D,
the fraction of satisfying neighbor flips was 0.43—significantly more than in MS-D. This
evidence suggests that difference in performance between MS-D and DB is largely due to
the extra rounds required to produce flips in MS-D, rather than simultaneous, satisfying
neighbor flips.
Appealing to extra, non-flipping rounds does not seem to explain the relative
performance difference between MS-U and MS-D, as the ratio of rounds to flip rounds is
only 1.3 for MS-U—significantly less than for MS-D. An alternate explanation we propose
is that the relatively poor performance of MS-U is due to the fact that costs continue to be
attributed to a license when its respective clause becomes satisfied (note that prices are
increased only for unsatisfied clauses though). If the prices do not distinguish between
satisfied and unsatisfied clauses, it would seem that MS-U pricing may not provide a
effective indication of the relative difficulty of satisfying a clause. In contrast, recall that,
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Table 6
Performance of MS-D and DB on Controlled Backbone Size problems with 100 variables,
backbone size 30, and varying numbers of clauses. The protocols are measured by rounds
Clauses Backbone Success ratio Mean Median σ
Protocol: MS-D
449 30 1.00 3.10 × 103 7.92 × 102 1.03 × 104
411 30 1.00 1.56 × 103 6.24 × 102 3.57 × 103
435 30 0.99 4.16 × 103 9.69 × 102 1.30 × 104
429 30 1.00 3.51 × 103 1.24 × 103 7.47 × 103
423 30 1.00 4.45 × 103 1.15 × 103 1.10 × 104
418 30 0.99 4.87 × 103 1.50 × 103 1.19 × 104
411 30 0.97 5.40 × 103 7.79 × 102 1.74 × 104
403 30 0.96 7.67 × 103 1.21 × 103 2.01 × 104
Protocol: DB
449 30 1.00 6.86 × 102 2.20 × 102 1.44 × 103
441 30 1.00 1.20 × 103 2.16 × 102 7.66 × 103
435 30 1.00 5.89 × 102 2.04 × 102 2.10 × 103
429 30 1.00 8.25 × 102 2.72 × 102 1.77 × 103
423 30 1.00 9.64 × 102 3.32 × 102 1.91 × 103
418 30 0.99 1.76 × 103 4.61 × 102 9.93 × 103
411 30 1.00 1.32 × 103 3.71 × 102 4.31 × 103
403 30 1.00 2.17 × 103 4.27 × 102 6.25 × 103
Table 7
Comparison of simultaneous, satisfying flips for 50-variable Uniform Random 3-SAT
problems
Protocol Rounds Flips Flips per flip Neighbor flips
round ratio
MS-U 6.12 × 103 1.02 × 104 2.21 0.33
MS-D 896 473 2.02 0.23
DB 234 218 1.41 0
SFB 483 329 1.00 0
403 374 1.66 0
494 390 1.42 0.02
474 413 1.53 0.10
483 432 1.65 0.13
410 340 1.66 0.23
408 468 1.99 0.37
in MS-D, when a clause is satisfied, the agents currently demanding the associated license
receive price quotes of zero. Breakout attributes no cost to satisfied clauses. To test whether
attributing costs to satisfied clauses can be detrimental, we modified the breakout algorithm
so that it does just that and found that the algorithm rarely found satisfying assignments.
Of course MS-U did not perform this poorly, but it does differ from breakout in other ways,
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as described in Section 6. Still, this test suggests that we have identified a significant cause
of the relatively poor performance of MS-U.
7.2. On decentralization
The MarketSAT protocols are highly decentralized in the sense that agents need only
know about and communicate with auctions for their own licenses (which in turn requires
knowledge about the clauses in which they are contained), and auctions need communicate
only with the agents that participate in them. Agents need not communicate with, or even
know the existence of agents for other variables. Similarly, auctions need not communicate
with each other. In DB, an agent must know in which clauses its variable is contained and
must also communicate with all variables in those clauses. MarketSAT can operate fully
asynchronously. In DB, variables must synchronize with their neighbors to detect quasi-
local minima and to ensure that neighbor variables do not flip simultaneously.
Decentralization based on prices may offer particular advantages in some contexts.
For instance, to extend the method from satisfaction to optimization problems, it is often
helpful to quantify the value of relaxing constraints. Prices support tradeoff resolution by
placing conflicting alternatives on a common scale. Markets provide a natural approach
to derive prices in a decentralized manner, from the distributed interactions of elements
responsible for distinct components of a problem.
The experiments with MS-D suggest that a highly decentralized market-inspired
protocol can actually perform quite well. Indeed, it performed comparably to the
centralized GSAT algorithm and its performance was within a factor of four worse than
DB. Experiments with variants on MS-D suggest that even better performance can be
obtained with the same degree of decentralization. Still, it is an open question whether
decentralized approaches could perform as well as the best centralized SAT algorithms.
Although we can presently meet the performance of GSAT, much improved centralized
algorithms have been developed since the advent of GSAT. Centralized algorithms can
utilize techniques such as restarts (which contributed significantly to the performance
of GSAT and subsequent hill-climbing based algorithms) and random flips (e.g., as in
WalkSAT [17]) to help reduce heavy tails in the performance distribution. We found that
restarts can significantly improve the performance of MS-D. For example, with 10n max
flips and 1000 max restarts, MS-D can solve all 175-variable problem instances within
the bound, with average rounds 2.69 × 104, median 1.1 × 104, and σ = 5.00 × 104.
Although restarts could be implemented in a synchronous system with cooperating agents,
it is not obvious how such techniques might be utilized in a distributed, asynchronous
system. Moreover, we do not have any intuition for an economic interpretation of restarts.
With respect to random flips, it would be straightforward for agents to independently flip
randomly in some fraction of the bidding rounds, but again it is not clear how to interpret
this in economic terms.
7.3. Economic interpretation and rational behavior
The interpretation of the market-inspired protocols in economic terms requires a model
of agent values under which the assumed behavior would be plausibly rational. In MS-O,
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we assume that the consumer places value vc on achieving a satisfying allocation, and
is willing to pay money for the allocation. The producers and suppliers seek to acquire
surplus profit for their participation.
In MS-U and MS-D, since there is no consumer, there is not a single source of value for
obtaining a satisfying solution. Furthermore since variable agents do not provide outputs to
other agents, they have no potential source of income to make a monetary profit. Rather, for
a variable agent au to be willing to participate in these protocols, and hence be willing to
pay money for their allocations, it must obtain some individual value vau from participating
in a satisfying solution. A variable agent obtains no value if it does not participate in a
satisfying solution. A variable agent wishes to maximize its surplus value, which is the
difference between the value it obtains and the total price it pays for the licenses it acquires.
In all protocols, the bidding policies are non-strategic in that agents do not account
for the effects of their behavior on the prices or allocations. This assumption may be
reasonable in large networks for which individual agents have little effect on the outcome,
or in uncertain situations where their effect is unpredictable [14,30]. However, as noted
above, a deeper strategic analysis would be required to establish fully rational behavior.
In MS-U and MS-D, the bidding policies can be considered myopic and best-response
in that agents always bid to optimize their surplus given the current price quotes, without
speculating about future price changes. In MS-O, the producers are myopically bidding to
obtain at least zero surplus, based on current prices. The plausibility of these approaches
depends on how accurately the price quotes indicate the prices agents may actually have to
pay for their final allocations. For all protocols, the price quotes indicate what the agents
would pay if the bidding stopped in the current state.
However, the protocols differ significantly in how price quotes signal future price
movements. In MS-O and MS-U, the nondecreasing price quotes indicate lower bounds
on the amount that agents would have to pay, providing a basis for agents’ belief in the
price quotes. Since prices do not decrease, in MS-U we would also expect that, in addition
to the agent quiescence condition specified in Section 5.1, a rational variable agent would
stop bidding when the total cost of an assignment exceeds vau .
In MS-D, agents actually pay nothing for a globally satisfying allocation, and would
have positive payments only if the protocol were to terminate with an unsatisfying
allocation. Thus, unlike in MS-U, we would expect rational agents to stop bidding only
when they reach a satisfying allocation (as specified in Section 5.2). But this calls into
question the usefulness of the price quotes as meaningful future price indicators. The
bidding policies in MS-D would be more plausibly rational if the agents had a reasonable
expectation that the protocol could terminate at any time, for instance if the auctions
terminated negotiations based on a random signal. Indeed, such a mechanism may be useful
both to encourage desirable behavior and to bound the length of negotiations.
8. Conclusions
We showed that supply chain formation is NP-complete by transforming SAT problems
into task dependency networks. We also showed that we can then solve SAT problems
using a distributed market protocol for supply chain formation. That a market protocol
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designed for other purposes can be fairly directly applied to SAT problems provides
existential evidence for highly decentralized market-inspired solution methods to general
classes of combinatorial problems. Moreover, it is intriguing that the original MarketSAT
protocol succeeds without explicit search state or randomization. However, in practice,
the performance of original MarketSAT, based directly on task dependency networks, is
impractically slow.
We can improve the performance of the MarketSAT protocols by simplifying the market
structure. The pricing method also significantly affects performance, with the differential
pricing protocol roughly seven times better than uniform pricing, and comparable in
performance to GSAT. However, the differential pricing protocol is less justifiable in terms
of rational economic agent behavior. Although the variant MarketSAT protocols perform
significantly better than the original MarketSAT, the less decentralized distributed breakout
algorithm still outperforms the differential pricing MarketSAT by a factor of three to four.
We found that the fraction of simultaneous, satisfying neighbor flips does not explain
the difference in performance across MarketSAT protocols, as originally conjectured.
However, the evidence suggests that MarketSAT with uniform pricing performs worse
than with differential pricing because the former attributes costs to satisfied clauses while
the latter does not. Evidence further suggests that distributed breakout solves problems
faster than MarketSAT with differential pricing because the former requires fewer rounds
to produce a flip.
An informal analysis suggests that the price-guided search of the MarketSAT protocols
works because the protocols resemble the centralized breakout algorithm. We might
cautiously apply this intuition to the operation of SAMP-SB in general task dependency
networks, but further analysis is necessary to properly account for a broader class of
structures.
We have identified tradeoffs in terms of runtime performance, decentralization, and
the plausibility of assumed agent behaviors. Understanding these tradeoffs is necessary
to make informed engineering decisions about the appropriateness and applicability of
alternate decentralized approaches to a particular problem environment.
The market approach has the benefit of providing a price-based interface for an agent
to evaluate and direct its behavior in the context of its broader decision making. To better
understand and further develop market approaches to complex coordination problems, we
must explicitly incorporate a model of the agents’ economic motivations in the context of
the problem to be solved. Future work should also investigate extension of the protocols to
optimization problems, and include a deeper analysis of strategic agent behavior.
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